This article discusses the failure of both common and statute law to provide an adequate remedy for sexual harassment. The author adopts a comparative approach and examines the actio injuriarum of Roman law, which gives a remedy to plaintiffs for impairment of dignity caused by insult. He discusses how case law which has developed under Roman-Dutch law in South Africa has been used to provide a remedy for sexual harassment in a wide range of circumstances and suggests that tort law be developed along the same lines in Australia.
In 1956 a newspaper in South Africa published an article headlined '97 Lonely Nurses Want Boyfriends', advising readers that if they went to a local hospital, they would be welcomed by nurses, who were eager for male companionship. 1 The text was accompanied by photographs of three of the nurses. Under the Roman-Dutch common law of South Africa, this conduct gave rise to a legal action for impairment of dignity which enabled the nurses to sue the newspaper successfully for damages. By contrast, the many far more egregious instances of sexual harassment reported in Australia both face-toface 2 and in the online environment 3 are not remediable under the law of torts: Negligence provides no remedy in the absence of actual psychiatric injury, nor is there currently a tort of invasion of privacy. So far as statutory remedies are concerned, the definition of sexual harassment in s 28A of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) (and parallel state and territory legislation) covers any unwelcome sexual advance, request for sexual favours or other conduct of a sexual nature which would be reasonably anticipated as causing offence, humiliation or intimidation to another person. However, the key shortcoming of the legislation is that its scope is significantly limited by ss 28B-28L, which makes sexual harassment unlawful only in a specified range of circumstancesessentially in the contexts of employment, education and trading in public goods and services. 4 In other words, the Act provides no general societal remedy for harassment.
A further limitation of the statutory regime is that as a non-judicial body, the Australian Human Rights Commission lacks the power to grant remedies, and so if what may be a time-consuming conciliation process 5 does not lead to the respondent agreeing to pay compensation, the only avenue for the plaintiff to recover them is by launching proceedings de novo in the Federal Circuit Court. 6 In the case of state and territory law, the fact that separation of powers does not apply means that anti-discrimination tribunals can order payment of damages, but again only after the matter has gone through a prior process of investigation and attempted conciliation. 7 In other words, an action for damages is possible only after overcoming the initial hurdle of going through a lengthy intermediate process, which in many cases will prove a deterrent to plaintiffs and a buffer for defendants.
This article adopts a comparative approach to the issue of sexual harassment, arguing for the recognition of a new tort to remedy this wrong, drawing on the example provided by the South African legal system, where dignity is a recognised personality interest protected by an action which has its origins in Roman law. As will be explained, this action for impairment of dignity is capable of remedying injury to feelings in a wide range of circumstances. However, this article is confined to its application in the specific context of sexual harassment.
The article first outlines the history of the action in Roman and Roman-Dutch law and then examines the development of the action as part of the common law of South Africa, focussing on its specific application to sexual harassment. The article then discusses to what extent dignitary interests are protected by English common law, in particular by the tort of intentional infliction of emotional harm. The final part of the article proposes that the courts in Australia develop the common law so as to recognise dignity as interest protected by the law of torts, and insult as conduct which impairs that interest, thereby making sexual harassment actionable in all its forms.
Dignity as an actionable right under Roman and Roman-Dutch law
In contrast to the ad hoc growth of the common law of torts through case law, the Roman law of civil wrongs, or delict, was highly structured, and was based on two actions, which protected different interests. Pecuniary interests were protected by the actio legis Aquiliae.
8
Personality interests were protected by the actio injuriarum (literally, the 'action for harms'), which had its foundations in a provision imposing punishment for physical harm contained in the Twelve Tables of c 450BC , the earliest statement of Roman law. 9 The scope of the remedy was extended during the Republican period so as to remedy harms taking the form of public verbal abuse, affronts to chastity and defamation. 10 The final authoritative statement appeared in the Digest, part of the codification by the emperor Justinian (527-565 AD). The harms remedied by the actio injuriarum were categorised as: 'omnemque iniuriam aut in corpus inferri aut ad dignitatem aut ad infamiam pertinere' that is translated as 'every contumely [which] is inflicted upon the person or relates to one's dignity or involves disgrace '. 11 It is on the basis of this text that the action came to protect three distinct interests: corpus (bodily integrity), fama (reputation) and dignitas (dignity).
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While the action to remedy infringements of corpus has its obvious equivalent in the English common law actions for assault and battery, and the action to remedy fama parallels the English common law action for defamation, the action to remedy dignitas has no equivalent in English common law. What then is meant by dignitas?
Key to answering this question is an understanding that:
although one may identify . . . corpus and the fama as independent personality rights with a more or less fixed meaning, the same cannot be said of dignitas . the 11th to 14th centuries, and led to the widespread adoption of Roman law, adapted to modern requirements, throughout Western Europe. 14 In the Netherlands, Roman law was modified by rules of law from the various provinces of that country to form Roman-Dutch common law. The writings of legal scholars, supplemented by case law, constitute the authoritative source of that law. 15 The understanding among the Roman-Dutch authorities of the concept of dignitas was summarised by De Villiers as follows:
by dignity [is meant] that valued and serene condition in his social or individual life which is violated when he is, either publicly or privately, subjected by another to offensive and degrading treatment, or when he is exposed to ill-will, ridicule, disesteem or contempt. The rights referred to are absolute or primordial rights. . . . Every person has an inborn right to the tranquil enjoyment of his peace of mind, secure against . . . degrading or humiliating treatment.
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So dignitas is an all-embracing interest, capable of extension so as to protect a wide range of rights, extending well beyond a right not to be subject to verbal insult. This became evident as the Roman-Dutch law of delict was developed through case law in South Africa.
The actio injuriarum in South African case law and its application to sexual harassment Roman-Dutch law became the common law of the Cape of Good Hope following the establishment of a Dutch colony in 1652. This continued to be the case even after the colony was acquired by the British in 1814. RomanDutch law also became the common law of the other colonies of Southern Africa which, in combination, eventually formed the Union of South Africa in 1910. The arrival of English lawyers and judges inevitably meant that South African law came to be heavily influenced by English law principles, to the extent that the common law of South Africa is described as a hybrid of Roman-Dutch and English common law. 17 Nevertheless, its Roman-Dutch foundation means that differences -greater in some branches of the law than others -persist between Roman-Dutch and English common law. As is stated by Burchell: 18 Legal systems rooted in the English, rather than the Roman, tradition have developed sophisticated protection for reputation in the laws of libel and slander, and they protect physical integrity through civil actions for trespass to the person, assault and battery. However, the protection of that precious and inherent attribute of human personality -dignity -does not exist in the common law of these systems. . . . The protection of human dignity under the actio injuriarum is undoubtedly one of the most impressive and enduring legacies of Roman law, and a feature which places the South African law of delict at the forefront of the protection of what is arguably the most fundamental of all human rights.
Through the development of case law, the actio injuriarum has been extended to allow recovery of damages for impairment of dignitas in a wide range of circumstances.
The most recent formulation of the elements of the action is contained in Delange v Costa, 19 in which the court held that for liability to be established, the plaintiff must show that the defendant performed an intentional act which led the plaintiff subjectively to experience loss of dignity and that the conduct complained of would have offended the dignity of a person of ordinary sensibilitiesin other words, that the conduct was offensive to dignity from an objective point of view.
What are the practical implications of this dual test? First, so far as the first requirement (that of a subjective feeling of insult) is concerned, this does not mean that the plaintiff must undergo some type of emotional trauma. 20 The plaintiff may in fact undergo the impairment of dignitas with stoicism, yet this provides no reason why they should be denied compensation for infringement of a right of personality. The subjective requirement is, therefore, understood as simply requiring that a plaintiff prove locus standi -that they were the object of the behaviour which is alleged to have constituted an infringement of a right of personality.
The real determinant of liability is therefore provided by the second element -the objective test -in respect of which the court in Delange v Costa held that:
In determining whether or not the act complained of is wrongful the court applies the criterion of reasonableness. . . . This is an objective test. It requires the conduct complained of to be tested against the prevailing norms of society (ie, the current values and thinking of the community) in order to determine whether such conduct can be classified as wrongful. To address the words to another which might wound his self-esteem but which are not, objectively determined, insulting (and therefore wrongful) cannot give rise to an action for injuria. 
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One of features of actio injuriarum which distinguishes it from the American tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the name of which (and requirement that conduct complained of be 'outrageous') serves to indicate the type of emotional hurt the defendant must be proved to have caused. The objective test in cases brought for impairment of dignity thus plays the same role as does the reasonableness in defamation law and requires the court to ask whether the conduct complained of was such that a reasonable person would have found it insulting. This requirement plays the key role of filtering liability and ensures that the action cannot be brought by the hypersensitive litigant.
As stated earlier, the range of interests embraced by dignitas, and thus the types of conduct that have been found to constitute an impairment of it, is very broad and case law shows that these include many types of conduct amounting to sexual harassment. As might be expected, sexist verbal insults form a significant proportion of reported cases. 22 Liability has also been found in cases of unwelcome propositioning for sexual intercourse, 23 indecent exposure, 24 unwelcome exposure to pornography 25 and the displaying to a plaintiff a photograph of her with sexually explicit comments written on it. 26 The actio injuriarum has also been developed so as to protect privacy and, as a result, liability has been found in cases taking the form of intrusion (for example, so-called Peeping Tom cases, 27 intrusion into female change rooms 28 and persistent following 29 ) and publication of intimate facts about the plaintiff's life (as in the case of the nurses cited earlier). 30 In other words, the action has been sufficient to provide a remedy in a wide range of circumstances falling within the concept of sexual harassment.
The failure of English common law to remedy impairment of dignity
To a person trained in English or Australian common law, these Roman law concepts may seem alien, although it should be noted that through the study of Roman law in 12th-and 13th-century England, the actio injuriarum influenced the development of trespass 31 and punitive damages at common law. 32 Nevertheless, the fact remains that English common law did not develop any tort remedying insult per se. 33 The closest the common law came to developing an action for impairment of dignity was the action for intentional infliction of emotional harm. Does it provide a remedy of sufficient breadth to address sexual harassment? The tort was first recognised in Wilkinson v Downton, 34 in which the plaintiff suffered psychiatric shock at hearing a deliberate false report that her husband had been killed in a railway accident. The action was subsequently recognised in Australia 35 but, as in England, 36 is available only where the plaintiff suffers actual psychological injury, not mere emotional distress. 37 The elements of the action were most recently defined in Australia in Clavel v Savage 38 where, after reviewing the Australian authorities, Rothman J held that the tort was available for the 'occasioning of harm (including psychiatric injury, but not mere distress) '. 39 Despite this, there have been judicial statements to the effect that the tort should be broadened: in his dissenting judgment in Giller v Procopets, Maxwell P stated that the tort should make mental distress actionable even where it does not result in a recognised psychiatric condition. 40 In Wainwright v Home Office, 41 Hoffmann LJ suggested obiter that conduct intended to cause emotional distress falling short of psychiatric injury might be actionable. (Second) of Torts states that the plaintiff must prove that the defendant intentionally or recklessly engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct which has caused the plaintiff severe emotional distress. 43 Contrary to the requirements in England and Australia, there is no need for the plaintiff to prove psychiatric illness, 44 and to that extent the tort might be thought to come closer to giving a remedy for impairment of dignity. However, although the requirement of 'outrage' has been criticised for its imprecision, 45 it is nevertheless clear that the requirement means that 'liability clearly does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions or other trivialities'. 46 As is stated by Keeton, 'there can be no recovery for mere profanity, obscenity or abuse . . . or for insults, indignities or threats . . . the plaintiff cannot recover for mere hurt feelings.' 47 Furthermore, the Restatement emphasises that 'major outrage is essential to the tort, and the mere fact that the actor knows that the other will regard his conduct as insulting, or will have his feelings hurt, is not enough'. 48 There has been academic support in a number of common law jurisdictions for the recognition of insult as an actionable harm. In the United States, commentators have suggested that sexual harassment might be remedied through the removal of the requirement of 'outrage' from the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 49 In the United Kingdom, Birks has argued that the fact that the common law awards aggravated damages in cases where a recognised tort causes distress means that the concept of injuria lies nascent in the common law and ought to be developed into an independent tort remedying harassment. 50 In Australia, Sinha argued for the recognition of a new tort of sexual harassment -although this suggestion was confined to the employment context and did not formulate the elements of a new tort. 51 One is therefore left with the situation that the common law does not provide a remedy for insult. In England and Australia, actual psychiatric injury is required before damages can be claimed. In the United States the requirement of outrage sets the bar significantly higher than what is required for liability in South Africa.
A proposed dignitary tort as a remedy for sexual harassment
The failure of the common law to protect dignitary rights and the restricted scope of operation of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) would be remedied if the courts were to develop the common law so as to recognise dignity as interest protected by law and insult as conduct which impairs that interest. Obviously both 'dignity' and 'insult' are broad concepts, giving plaintiffs a right of action in a range of circumstances going beyond sexual harassment -hate speech being an obvious example which comes to mind. However, for the purposes of this article, discussion is confined to impairments of dignity taking the specific form of sexual harassment. So how would the argument in favour of the recognition of dignity as a right, and insult as a harm, be crafted?
Some assistance may be gained from the precedent of ABC Ltd v Lenah Game Meats.
52 Although in that case the High Court declined to recognise a new tort of invasion of privacy, members of the court indicated that the creation of a new tort was not objectionable per se and that such a step might be taken in a suitable case. 53 So if the courts are at least prepared to consider recognising a right to privacy -which conceptually is just one dimension of the broader personality right to dignity -as being worthy of vindication, what stands in the way of recognising the broader interest itself? I would argue that recognition of the emotional harm caused by insult as conduct infringing that right would not be that much of a leap for the common law to take.
Consider, for example, defamation. Is the harm caused to the plaintiff by that tort much different from that occasioned by insult? The harm in defamation obviously arises in the mind of the person to which the defamatory material is published in so far as their estimation of the plaintiff has diminished. However, that provides only part of the answer, because the reason why that reduction in estimation matters to the plaintiff is surely because of the emotional harm resulting from diminution in self-esteem caused in the mind of the plaintiff by the knowledge that their reputation has been harmed. 54 So, if the plaintiff in a defamation action obtains a remedy (at least in part) because they have experienced affront, humiliation and disruption of tranquillity, why should not the same harms be actionable if occasioned by insult -in the specific case being considered in this article insulting conduct 43 amounting to sexual harassment? The argument here is that the law should broaden what it recognises as 'harm' so as to make impairment of dignity by insult actionable in the same way that it remedies the emotional harm caused by defamation.
There is little doubt that the social harm caused by sexual harassment, its continuing pervasiveness and the severity of the psychological effects it has on its victims 55 provide legal policy justification for the courts to develop the common law so as to recognise a tort remedying sexual harassment. Such a step would confer several advantages on plaintiffs: First, and most importantly, it would provide a remedy for sexual harassment occurring in all circumstances, which is an improvement on statute law which provides a remedy only in those specific circumstances covered by the legislation. Second, by providing plaintiffs with the option of taking direct legal action for damages without having to go through conciliation, the law would potentially provide redress more quickly than does the statutory regime. This would be particularly so given that the amount of damages sought would, in many cases, fall below the caps applicable to the minor claims jurisdiction in magistrates' courts or in civil and administrative tribunals, which have the advantage that they are cost-free jurisdictions using processes which are comparatively speedy and simple. Third, the possibility of facing immediate civil action for damages would be likely to have a deterrent effect on those who might otherwise engage in harassing behaviour. Since the prospect of civil liability curbs defamatory speech, it is arguable that the activities of harassers would be deterred by the prospect of civil liability.
Taking all the above into account, how should the elements of such a tort be framed? I would suggest that the following formulation is sufficiently broad to capture the range of circumstances in which sexual harassment may arise: 'A person who intentionally engages in conduct or directs communications of a sexual nature towards another person which a reasonable person would find insulting is liable to that other person for the tort of sexual harassment. ' The action for impairment of dignity in South African law has ancient roots, but its continued vibrancy provides a model for the development of a similar tort in Australia. The South African case law demonstrates how such an action would provide the degree of flexibility needed to impose liability for the multifarious forms sexual harassment may take.
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